2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

1-24-2013

USA v. Haron Tucker

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Haron Tucker" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1341.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1341

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 11-2641
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
HARON TUCKER
also known as
RONALD TUCKER
also known as
DANIEL SMITH
Haron Tucker,
Appellant
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 08-cr-230-1)
District Judge: Honorable Nora Barry Fischer
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 13, 2012
______________
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: January 24, 2013)

______________
OPINION
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Haron Tucker (“Tucker”) appeals the District Court’s June 10, 2011 judgment and
sentence of 180 months of imprisonment. Tucker pled guilty to possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). His counsel filed a brief,
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that no nonfrivolous
issues exist for appeal and seeking to withdraw as counsel. For the reasons set forth
below, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment and sentence
of the District Court.
I. Background
We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential
facts.
While on patrol in police vehicles on June 21, 2007, City of Pittsburgh police
officers saw a group of men, including Tucker, standing in front of a building. As the
officers approached in their vehicles, they observed Tucker backing away from the group
while holding the right side of his waistband. When the officers exited their vehicles,
Tucker fled and the officers pursued him. During the pursuit, Tucker took a gun from his
waistband and threw it into some bushes. Tucker was soon apprehended and a .380
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millimeter Bersa automatic handgun was recovered from the bushes.
A federal grand jury charged Tucker with possessing a firearm while being a
convicted felon. Tucker’s counsel filed two motions: a motion to dismiss the Indictment
on jurisdictional grounds and a motion to suppress Tucker’s post-arrest statements.
Tucker subsequently pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The Presentence Report (“PSR”) reflected an advisory Guideline range of 168 to 210
months of imprisonment. However, because Tucker was also designated as an armed
career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), the lower end of the
sentencing range rose to a mandatory minimum of 180 months of imprisonment. Tucker
sought a downward variance, asserting that the statutory sentencing enhancement under §
924(e) was inapplicable and that the mitigating provisions of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 should
apply. The District Court rejected these arguments and sentenced Tucker to 180 months
of imprisonment.
II. Jurisdiction
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III. Standard of Review
“In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), the Supreme Court explained
the general duties of a lawyer representing an indigent criminal defendant on appeal
when the lawyer seeks leave to withdraw from continued representation on the grounds
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that there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal.” United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778,
779 (3d Cir. 2000). The attorney must always “support his client’s appeal to the best of
his ability.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. If, however, “counsel finds his case to be wholly
frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and
request permission to withdraw.” Id.
To withdraw, counsel must “satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured
the record in search of appealable issues,” and “explain why the issues are frivolous.”
Marvin, 211 F.3d at 779-80. Thus, this Court’s inquiry when considering a lawyer’s
Anders brief is two-fold: we must determine “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled
[Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2’s] requirements; and (2) whether an
independent review of the record presents any non-frivolous issues.” United States v.
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). In accordance with 3d Cir. L.A.R. Rule 109.2,
if an appeal is judged to be wholly frivolous, this Court must “grant trial counsel’s
Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without appointing new counsel.” United
States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).

III. Analysis
Counsel thoroughly reviewed the record and concluded that: (1) the record
provides no support for a motion to invalidate the guilty plea; (2) the motion to dismiss
the indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction lacks merit based on Third Circuit
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precedent; (3) the suppression motion was rendered moot by the guilty plea and, even if
this were not the case, it lacks merit on appeal; and (4) the sentence imposed by the
District Court was both procedurally and substantively sound.
A. Validity of Guilty Plea
A criminal defendant’s guilty plea is considered valid if entered “knowing[ly],
voluntary[ily] and intelligent[ly].” United States v. Tidwell, 521 F.3d 236, 251 (3d Cir.
2008). To ensure that a plea is knowing and voluntary, the district court must “address
the defendant personally in open court,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c), advise defendant of the
consequences of his or her plea, and ensure that defendant understands them. United
States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)).
To challenge the validity of his guilty plea, Tucker would have had to demonstrate
that the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
constitutional requirements of Boykin had not been satisfied. However, having reviewed
the plea colloquy and record, counsel found no basis for the argument that Tucker’s plea
was unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent. We agree with counsel’s conclusion that
the record shows Tucker’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.
B. Motion to Dismiss for Unconstitutionality of Statute
Tucker moved to dismiss the Indictment for lack of federal subject matter
jurisdiction, on the ground that the weapon described in the Indictment was never in
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interstate commerce because it had been manufactured overseas and imported into
Pennsylvania, where it remained until his arrest. Tucker argued that his conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits the possession of a firearm “in or affecting
commerce” by a convicted felon, was therefore an unconstitutional over-reach into intrastate affairs. Tucker relied on Supreme Court rulings in three cases which limit the
federal government’s ability to justify legislation by the Commerce Clause: United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
The motion to dismiss was terminated as moot due to Tucker’s guilty plea.
Renewing this argument would be frivolous because this Court has held § 922(g)(1) to be
a constitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, even after Lopez,
Morrison, and Jones. See United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2002).
Coward reaffirmed the reasoning of United States v. Singletary, which held that
“[s]ection 922(g)(1), by its very terms, only regulates those weapons affecting interstate
commerce by being the subject of interstate trade” and fits squarely within Congress’s
commerce power. 268 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2001).
Proof that the possessed firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce is
sufficient to satisfy the required nexus between possession and commerce. Scarborough
v. United States. 431 U.S. 563 (1977). In this case, the interstate commerce element of
the offense was met because, as Tucker himself asserted, the gun referenced in the
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Indictment had been manufactured overseas and imported into the United States.
Counsel is correct that renewing a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds has no
merit on appeal.
C. Motion to Suppress Statements
Tucker also moved to suppress statements he made to the arresting officer after
being apprehended, arguing that they were the product of custodial interrogation elicited
without the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Tucker
maintained, in the alternative, that the coercive climate of the arrest and the experience of
being handcuffed rendered his post-arrest statements inadmissible and subject to
suppression.
Tucker’s counsel notes that this motion was terminated as moot by Tucker’s guilty
plea. A defendant’s unconditional, knowing and voluntary guilty plea acts as a waiver of
non-jurisdictional defects, Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2007), including
waiver of pre-trial claims that police illegally seized evidence or elicited inculpatory
testimony without first administering Miranda warnings, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 267 (1973)). The challenge to statements made while in custody was waived by the
guilty plea and is not appealable.
Even if the suppression motion had not been foreclosed from appellate review by
the guilty plea, the motion would fail on its merits. The record shows that Tucker was
not subject to interrogation from police at the time he made the inculpatory statements;
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instead, he spontaneously volunteered his reason for running from police. A motion to
suppress his statements would, therefore, be frivolous.
D. Reasonableness of Sentence
Finally, Tucker may challenge the reasonableness of the sentencing, including the
imposition of a fifteen-year sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
In evaluating an appeal of a sentence, we review the District Court’s sentencing
decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009). Procedurally, a
district court must (1) calculate a defendant’s sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines,
(2) formally rule on any departure motions and state on the record whether it is granting a
departure, and (3) exercise its discretion by considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
3553(a). See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). If the sentence
was procedurally reasonable, this Court considers the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence based on the totality of the circumstances. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567 (citing
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
At sentencing, Tucker made several objections to the PSR. Relying on
§ 4A1.2(2) 1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, he argued that two prior drug offenses were

1

Section 4A1.2(2) provides that “[p]rior sentences always are counted separately
if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest
(i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second
offense). If there is no intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted separately unless
(A) the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument; or
8

related cases, consolidated for hearing, and should be treated as one for the purpose of
computing his criminal history. Tucker also argued that these two convictions should not
be counted separately towards the three predicate offenses required for the application of
the ACCA. Tucker relied on the mistaken assertion that the two 2001 Pennsylvania state
court convictions, noted at paragraphs 27 and 28 of the PSR, occurred only eight days
apart. In fact, the crimes were separated by approximately sixteen months and were
properly counted as individual crimes for the purpose of criminal history points.
With respect to the ACCA, this Court has adopted the “separate episodes” test for
the application of the statute, holding that “where the defendant receives multiple
convictions in a single judicial proceeding … the individual convictions may be counted
for the purposes of sentencing enhancement so long as the criminal episodes were distinct
in time.” 2 United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 73 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing United
States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir. 1989)). Despite the fact that the two
convictions in question were consolidated for plea and sentence, the two state court
convictions occurred many months apart at “distinct points in time,” and were properly
counted as separate offenses.

(B) the sentences were imposed on the same day. Count any prior sentence covered by
(A) or (B) as a single sentence.”
2

This Court went on to say that its adoption of the “separate episode test” accords
with both the meaning of the unambiguous statutory language and the legislative intent
underlying the ACCA. United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 74 (3d Cir. 1989).
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Tucker also sought a variance on fairness grounds. He maintained that the
statutory sentencing enhancement under § 924(e) should not be applied because it overrepresents the seriousness of his criminal history. Tucker suggested that the proper
course of action for sentencing is to apply the mitigating provisions of U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(a)(2) to the determination regarding whether he was lawfully designated as an
Armed Career Criminal. The District Judge considered this argument but found that the
applicability of the ACCA enhancement is determined under a separate test from that of
the Guidelines calculation for criminal history points under § 4A1.2(a)(2). See Brown v.
United States, 636 F.3d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 2011).
Counsel is correct that § 4A1.2 neither mandates a lower sentence nor informs the
application of the ACCA. Therefore, the District Court did not err in interpreting the
Guidelines as independent of the statutorily prescribed minimum sentence. See Dorsey v.
United States, 132 S.Ct. 2321 (2012) (noting that maximum or minimum sentence set by
sentencing statutes trumps the Sentencing Guidelines, and a sentencing judge must
sentence an offender to at least the minimum prison term set forth in a statutory
mandatory minimum).
Counsel also points out that it would be frivolous to claim that the District Court
erred in denying Tucker’s request for a downward variance because 18 U.S.C. § 3553
specifically prohibits sentencing courts from imposing sentences below a stated statutory
minimum, unless an explicit exception to the minimum sentence applies. United States v.
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Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 2011). See also United States v. Kellum, 356
F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2004). No such exception exists in this case.
Prior to recognizing that a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months was
required, the District Court correctly calculated Tucker’s sentence under the Sentencing
Guidelines, formally ruled on Tucker’s departure motions, stated his reasons on the
record, and considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The District Court
sentence was procedurally and substantively sound and no nonfrivolous challenge to the
sentencing procedure exists.
VI.

Conclusion

We find that no nonfrivolous issues exist for consideration on appeal. We will
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, pursuant to Anders, and affirm the judgment and
sentence of the District Court. Counsel is also relieved of any obligation to file a petition
for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(b).

11

